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Abstract
The AICPA recently finished a harmonization
project to converge U.S. audit standards with those
of the International Audit and Assurance Standards
Board. The assumption implicit in this project is
that users of financial statements will benefit from a
converged, or consistent set of audit standards.
Additionally, the AICPA’s clarified auditing
standard AU-C700, Audit Conclusions and
Reporting, now requires explicit acknowledgement
of the auditor’s responsibility for fraud procedures
in the auditor’s report, which is the focus of
advisory committees in both the U.S. Department of
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Treasury and the European Commission. Therefore,
the purpose of this study is to investigate how users
(U.S. and French) rate a harmonized audit
communication. Specifically, we test perceptions of
the auditor’s internal control report using the
PCAOB’s AS2 report. Results indicate that U.S.
and French users rate the report similarly, with no
significant differences along dimensions of
readability, reliability, and liability. Additionally,
we investigate how user perceptions change when
evaluating a report that contains wording as to the
auditor’s fraud detection responsibility. Results
indicate that while U.S. users’ perceptions increase
positively when fraud wording is added, French
perceptions remain unchanged. Overall, our results
suggest that both U.S. and non-U.S. users perceive
the information from an auditor’s internal control
report the same.
However, specific wording
changes (like fraud) do not universally increase
positive perceptions perhaps because of countryspecific legal and regulatory environments.

INTRODUCTION
The harmonization of financial accounting and reporting
standards has received much attention over the last few years (for
example, Daske et al., 2008; Hail et al., 2010a, 2010b; Bradshaw et
al., 2010). A much less public harmonization project, however,
has recently been concluded by the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA). This Clarity Project rewrote every
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) to converge as far as
possible with International Standards on Auditing (ISA). During
the Clarity Project, the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board
harmonized its agenda with the International Audit and Assurance
Standards Board (IAASB) in an effort to converge U.S. GAAS
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with international standards. This Clarity Project is an important
step in the globalization of auditing standards. As such, the
purpose of this research is to compare perceptions of harmonized
audit communications across U.S. and non-U.S. users.
In particular, we use the auditor’s internal control report as
an example of a harmonized audit communication. Since the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, internal control
reporting has been a much debated topic in the U.S. and Europe
(Baker, 2005; Gornik-Tomaszewski & McCarthy, 2005; Baker,
2006). In particular, the European Commission (EC) has issued
what is referred to as EuroSox, amendments to the Fourth, Seventh
and Eight directives. Related to internal control reporting, these
revised directives require company directors to describe their
internal control processes in annual reports.
While these
requirements stop short of requiring an external audit opinion, they
do require external auditors to ensure the reports are consistent
with the company’s financial statements and require that external
auditors provide the audit committee with an annual report on
internal control (Baker, 2005).
Additionally, the auditor’s responsibility for fraud detection
has received much global attention. During the timeframe of the
Clarity Project the IAASB issued ISA 240 (redrafted), The
Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of
Financial Statements in 2006 and the AICPA issued SAS 113,
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, in 2007.
Both standards require auditors to design and perform audit
procedures to detect and prevent material misstatements due to
fraud (Selley & Turner, 2004) with an emphasis on procedures
designed to understand internal controls related to financial
reporting (Ramos, 2003).
Furthermore, the AICPA recently issued clarified statement
AU-C 700, Audit Conclusions and Reporting, which prescribes a
revised auditor’s report to include: (i) management’s responsibility
to implement “internal control relevant to the preparation and fair
presentation of financial statements that are free from material
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misstatement, whether due to fraud or error” and (ii) auditor’s
responsibility for designing audit procedures depending on the
“auditor’s judgment, including the assessment of the risks of
material misstatement of the financial statements, whether due to
fraud or error.”1
Therefore, the purpose of this study is two-fold. First,
given the move toward the globalization of audit standards, the
study investigates non-U.S. user’s perceptions of the auditor’s
internal control report and compares those perceptions to a sample
of U.S. users. Second, the study examines the impact of fraud
wording on non-U.S. users’ evaluation of the report. Previous
research on U.S. users suggests that the inclusion of fraud detection
wording enhances users’ evaluation of the report when compared
to the mandated report that does not contain such wording (Foster
et al., 2010).
In this regard, we obtained and analyzed data using a
between-subjects experiment with 92 U.S. and 72 French subjects
as proxies for financial statement users. Subjects were MBA
students from a university in the Midwest region of the United
States and senior level accounting/finance students from a
university in the north of France. Participants were asked to
evaluate one of three auditor report formats on internal control
effectiveness over financial reporting: the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) AS2 mandated report with
a limitations paragraph (labeled as AS), the AS report without the
limitations paragraph (labeled as NL), and the NL report with fraud
wording (labeled as FW).
Based on the results of similar prior work (e.g., Foster et
al., 2005; Foster, et al., 2010) participants’ responses to survey
questions about the three auditor’s report formats (AS, NL, & FW)
were collapsed into three perceptual dimensions: readability,
reliability and auditor liability. Results of analyses indicate that
1

AU-C 700, Audit Conclusions and Reporting, will become effective for audits
of financial statements for the year ending on or after December 15, 2012.
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perceptions of French and U.S. users’ do not differ when
evaluating the prescribed PCAOB report on internal controls (AS
format). Perceptions do differ, however, when fraud wording is
added to the report (FW format). In particular, U.S. users’
perceptions about the FW format are significantly
favorable/positive, while French users’ perceptions remain
unchanged.
Overall, we expand the growing literature on accounting
harmonization by adding audit harmonization into the discussion.
To date, we are aware of no study that investigates the potential
impact of audit harmonization on users’ perceptions of audit
communications. Additionally, our study complements previous
studies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Beneish et al, 2008;
Hammersley et al., 2008; Schneider and Church, 2008; Lopez et
al., 2009) that suggest an auditor’s internal control report provides
information to users that is value relevant. By documenting that
U.S. and French users’ rate the PCAOB report similarly, our results
suggest that an auditor’s internal control report could provide value
relevant information to users outside the U.S.
Moreover, the inferences drawn from the evidence in this
study are useful to regulators, especially when confronted with the
impact this audit harmonization project between the AICPA and
IAASB may have on the PCAOB. Specifically, the Clarity Project
is the first complete redrafting and recodification of U.S. audit
standards since 1972 (Morris & Thomas, 2011). Since the PCAOB
has remained silent on the issue of harmonized auditing standards,
the impact of this globalization on U.S. public companies is
unknown.
The PCAOB, however, does review its audit standards for
revision based on its independent analyses of the continuing
applicability of existing interim standards, PCAOB inspections,
and economic developments (Morris & Thomas, 2011). Evidence
that U.S. and French users rate the internal control report similarly
provides support to the PCAOB their report format benefits a
potentially diverse user group and may help to shape any
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harmonization of their standards and globalization of audit
reporting.
Furthermore, the differing U.S. and French perceptions
regarding the inclusion of fraud wording in the internal control
report would be useful to regulators as they raise concerns about
the adequacy of audit reports. Specifically, the U.S. Department of
the Treasury’s Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession
recommended the PCAOB clarify in the audit report the auditor’s
role in detecting fraud.2
Additionally, the European Commission and the Audit
Practices Board of the United Kingdom are currently discussing
potential changes to their respective auditor reports (Grant, 2008)
due to user misperceptions, among other things, regarding the
auditor’s responsibility for fraud (Gray et al., 2011). Evidence that
fraud wording in an auditor’s internal control report enhances U.S.
users’ perceptions and not French users’ perceptions highlights the
country-specific legal and institutional traditions that have shaped
audit policy and therefore, would shape audit harmonization.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
next section presents the background and research questions. The
third section discusses the research methodology, while the fourth
section presents the results of our statistical tests. The paper is
concluded in section five.
BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The AICPA has historically heralded internal control
reports as way to strengthen an entity’s internal control framework
and reduce financial statement fraud (Cohen Commission, 1978;
Treadway Commission 1987; COSO 1992). While those various
Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession – Report dated October 6,
2008, Part VII, Firm Structure & Finances – Recommendation #5.
http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/acap/index.shtml
2
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commissions recommended management and auditor reports on
internal controls, the requirement was not mandated in the U.S.
until passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 20023. So, while the reporting
requirement is relatively new, the concepts and framework (i.e.,
COSO) associated with internal controls are well-developed in the
U.S.
In France, internal control reports are mandated by article
117 of the Financial Security Act (Loi Sẻcuritẻ Financiẻre) of 2003
(LSF). According to the Financial Markets’ Authority (Autoritẻ
des Marchẻs Financiers, AMF hereafter), these standards require
the Chairman of the Board of Directors to give an account on the
internal control procedures the company has implemented (AMF
2007). Article 120 of the LSF requires the external auditors to
present a report of their observations of the Chairman’s report
regarding the processing of accounting information (AMF 2007).
The framework used to assess internal controls, however,
was neither clearly defined nor mandated. In fact, companies could
choose from a range of internal control frameworks as defined by
COSO, AFEP/MEDEF (the joint guidelines of the French
Association of Private Companies, Association Française des
Entreprises Privẻes, and the French Business Confederation,
Mouvement des Entreprises de France), CNCC (the French
National Society of Auditors or Compagnie Nationale des
Commissaires aux Comptes), and IIA/IFACI (the joint guidelines
of the Institute of Internal Auditors and the French counterpart the
Institut Français des l’Audit et du Contrôle Internes). Given the
lack of a standard definition of internal control, only 33% of
companies indicated the standard they used to compile their
internal control report in 2005 (AMF 2006). In contrast, the
PCAOB standards (AS2 and AS5 which replaced AS2) on
auditor’s internal control reporting mandate the use of the criteria
based on COSO.
3

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 is an
exception requiring such reporting for all U.S. financial depository institutions
with assets over $500 million.
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As such, the AMF created a working group in 2005 to
develop an internal control framework for use by French
companies to meet the obligations of the LSF. The resulting
framework uses principles set forth by COSO and the British
Turnbull guidance and was written to ensure compliance with
French regulations and the revised 4th, 7th, and 8th European
directives. As a result, in 2008 73% of companies reference an
internal control framework in their report, with the AMF
framework, COSO or some combination of the two being the
overwhelming framework referenced (AMF 2008).
U.S. Versus French Perceptions of Internal Control Reports
How different countries create, disclose and use accounting
information has been a source of research for many years. Much of
that research has focused on the legal institutions of finance—the
legal origin of shareholder protection and the quality of its
enforcement (La Porta et al., 1998). This topic was operationalized
as the importance of equity markets using an aggregation of three
variables: the ratio of aggregate stock market capitalization to gross
national product, the number of listed domestic firms relative to the
population and the number of initial public offerings relative to the
population (La Porta et al., 1997).
This equity market importance variable is constructed such
that a higher score indicates a greater importance of the stock
market. It has been used in studies related to international
comparisons of earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003) and
differences in domestic accounting standards and International
Financial Reporting Standards (Ding et al., 2007). Both studies
conclude that the importance of equity markets is positively related
to better quality accounting information because the information
needs of outside shareholders limits insiders’ incentives to
manipulate accounting information.
An implication of those findings is that users of accounting
information in similarly ranked countries would require similar
types of information. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) suggest that
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non-U.S. firms voluntarily disclose IFRS financial information in
an attempt to lower the information asymmetry component of their
cost of capital. Ashbaugh (2001) finds that non-U.S. firms are
more likely to disclose IFRS financial information when
participating in seasoned equity offerings. Ding et al. (2007) find
that divergence, not absence, from prescribed IFRS is a result of
firms providing richer, firm-specific information to the capital
markets.
In those studies cited above, the U.S. and France are on two
ends of the spectrum related to the importance of equity markets.
Leuz et al., (2003) using data from La Porta et al., (1997), which
was collected in 1994, report that the U.S. has an equity market
importance of 23.3, while France has an index of 9.34. French
capital markets, however, have been transformed since that data
was collected. The country has gone through a competitive
disinflation policy, forcing large firms to the market, rather than
the government, for resources (Amable & Hanckẻ, 2001). In
addition, deregulation of the capital markets was initiated with the
European Transparency Directive which was codified into French
law in 1988. Since the codification of that directive, the pattern of
shareholding has changed where the degree of bank dependence in
the capital markets has declined (Kremp et al., 1999). In addition,
this deregulation opened the door for foreign institutional investors
(Morin, 2000).
Thus, measures of equity market importance in France have
changed since 1994. We calculated a more recent equity market
importance factor for this study. In 2009, the U.S. had an equity
market importance factor 15.45 while France had a factor of
16.015. While the French equity markets have increased in
4

Countries higher than the U.S. are Switzerland (24.8), Malaysia (25.3), the UK
(25.0), Hong Kong (28.8) and Singapore (28.8). Countries lower than France
are Indonesia (4.7), Germany (5.0), Philippines (5.7), Italy (6.5), Austria (7.0),
and Spain (7.2). All values are reported in Leuz et al. (2003).
5 Data was collected for every year from 1995 to 2009 for the U.S., France and
all members of the EC. Information about country population, gross domestic
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importance, it would be misleading to say the U.S. and France have
the same market structure. Rather, France is described as having
moved from “state-managed” capitalism to “state-led” capitalism
where the government still plays an active, although smaller role
than in years before (Schmidt, 2003). The French approach is
described as selective, based on social compromise (Lee & Yoo,
2008).
Notwithstanding the differences in market structure, equity
markets are important in both the U.S. and France. As such, we
would expect users of financial information in both countries to
find reports on internal controls over financial reporting to be
useful, since the internal control reports reduce information
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Thus, the first research
question is as follows:
Research question 1:
Do French and U.S. users’
perceptions of the internal control report differ?
The Auditor’s Environment
User’s perceptions of an auditor’s audit communication are
influenced by the environment in which the auditor performs her
work. Two aspects of the auditor’s environment that are applicable
to the internal control report are the auditor’s responsibility for
fraud and the auditor’s liability to third parties.
The Auditor’s Responsibility for Fraud Detection. The
auditor’s failure to meet public expectations regarding the auditor’s
responsibility for fraud detection is an on-going source of
confusion between users and auditors (DeJong & Smith, 1984;
Hooks et al., 1994) and has been documented as the source of
confusion in the U.K. (Humphrey et al., 1993), Australia (Low,
1980), and New Zealand (Porter, 1983). In the U.S., similar
studies have been performed that lend credibility to fraud detection
product, and listed domestic firms was collected from the World Bank. Data
about initial public offerings was collected from Bloomberg.
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responsibility as the source of confusion. For example, Epstein
and Geiger (1994) found that stockholders perceived auditors as
providing absolute assurance against fraud. Frank et al. (2001)
found significant differences between auditors and jurors regarding
fraud detection. Jurors view the auditing profession as a public
watchdog, actively searching for fraud. This confusion could lead
to a decline in the auditor’s usefulness to society (Carmichael,
2004).
Little research, however, has been devoted to user
perceptions of auditor fraud detection responsibility in France.
According to Jedidi and Richard (2009) French auditing research
has mainly focused on audit quality (Richard, 2000), auditor
independence (Mikol & Standish, 1998) and audit history (Mikol,
1993; Bocqueraz, 2000; Ramirez, 2005). One study, however, has
investigated auditor responsibility for fraud detection. Carassus
and Cormier (2003) found that French auditors who design their
tests more in-line with U.S. fraud standards are more likely to
detect fraud.
To date, no study has assessed French users’ attitudes
regarding the auditor’s responsibility for fraud detection. This
scarcity of research may be the result of the way in which auditor
responsibility is written into French law. Jedidi and Richard
(2009) provide a thorough review of user and auditor confusion
surrounding the audit function. In their review, however, the
auditor’s responsibility for fraud detection is not listed as a reason
for the expectation differences. In their estimation this may be
because French law requires auditors who discover some breach of
the law to report it to the public prosecutor. Thus, Jedidi and
Richard (2009) conclude that in addition to certifying accounts,
French auditors are also expected to detect fraud.
The Auditor’s Responsibility to Third Parties. The
auditor’s legal environment, whether created through the court
system or legislative branch, establishes the level of liability
auditor’s face as a consequence of their audit reporting. In the U.S.
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an auditor’s duty to third parties is a matter of state law, rather than
national law (Chung et al., 2010). Each state, therefore, has the
discretion to define a third party: either restrictive in that privity
must exist, or open, to include all foreseeable parties. Only two
states, however, use the most liberal definition of third party
liability, with the overwhelming majority of states limiting who
can be classified as a third party (Louwers et al., 2011). Thus, U.S.
auditors are typically held responsible to the providers of capital
(creditors and shareholders).
In France, the general basis for an auditor’s (commissaire
aux comptes) liability is specified in the Code Civil and is
specifically regulated under article 234, section 1, of the Loi sur les
Sociẻtẻs Commercials no. 66-537, which was adopted in 1966
(Baker & Quick, 1996). With this codification, the auditor’s status
changed from contractual (individual shareholders’ interest) to
statutory (general interest of the public) (Khoury, 2001). Auditor
liability, therefore, is broadly defined since their work is viewed to
be in the public interest (Khoury, 2001). Since third parties do not
have to be specifically known, France uses the most liberal
definition of a third party, the reasonable foreseeability standard
(Chung, et al., 2010).
An open question, therefore, is how French users will
perceive explicit acknowledgement of the auditor’s responsibility
for fraud in an audit communication. Previous research has shown
that U.S. users perceive more positively the auditor’s internal
control report with the inclusion of fraud wording (Foster, et al.,
2010). Consequently, we present the following research question
to explore non-professional users’ perceptions about the auditor’s
fraud detection responsibility:
Research question 2: Does the inclusion of wording
referencing the auditor’s responsibility for fraud detection
enhance both U.S. and French users’ perception of the
internal control report?
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METHOD
Research Questionnaire
The research questionnaire was developed as a variation of
the semantic differential technique used in accounting by Haried
(1972, 1973) and originally developed by Osgood et al. (1971) to
measure the connotative meaning of a concept. Osgood et al.
(1971) proposed that the meaning underlying a construct has three
dominant dimensions. Houghton (1987, 1988) found that these
three underlying dimensions applied to accounting, what Houghton
and Messier (1991) identified as evaluative, obligatory, and
potency. Prior studies have similarly found user perceptions of
audit reports to have three stable underlying dimensions. Monroe
and Woodliff (1993, 1994) identified these dimensions as
responsibility, reliability and prospects, while Gay et al. (1998)
referred to the dimensions as responsibility, reliability, and
decisions usefulness.
In this study, the questionnaire was developed to measure
perceptions of the message communicated through an auditor’s
internal control report. The eleven questions used were developed
based on prior literature regarding audit communications (Libby
1979; Nair and Rittenberg, 1987; Kelly and Mohrweis, 1989) and
has been used in prior research (e.g., Foster, et al., 2005; Foster, et
al., 2010). Deriving measures used in this study from existing
research helps to ensure their construct validity (O’Leary-Kelly &
Vokorka, 1998). The motivation behind the readability dimension
is to determine if U.S. and French users have differing perceptions
as to the purpose of the report, and to determine if those
perceptions would be reinforced or reduced by including fraud
language. Kelly and Mohrweis (1989) used similar questions to
assess the understandability of an audit report.
The reliability dimension is used to capture and compare
the degree of reliance U.S. and French users have on the internal
control system to produce financial statements that are not
materially misstated. Additionally, to the extent in which fraud
wording is more descriptive of the audit process, it could provide
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more information concerning the dependability of the financial
statements.
Libby (1979) and Nair and Rittenberg (1987)
identified a similar dimension which they referred to as the user’s
need for additional information and the usefulness of the financial
statements, respectively.
The third dimension, liability, captures U.S. and French
users’ perceptions of the extent the auditor is assuming legal
liability for the adequacy of the internal control structure. The
auditor’s report provides readers with an understanding as to the
relative responsibilities assumed by management and the auditor.
To the extent fraud wording provides additional or new
information about what an auditor is doing, it may change users’
perception of the relative responsibility of auditors and
management to establish and maintain a system of internal controls
over financial reporting. Nair and Rittenberg (1987) and Kelly and
Mohrweis (1989) measured auditor responsibility using similar
questions.

Participants and Design
The data was collected in 2009 from 92 MBA students
from an urban university in the Midwest area of the United States
and 72 senior-level accounting/finance students from a university
in the north of France. Three internal control report formats are
used in this study6. The first, labeled AS, is the format prescribed
by the PCAOB in AS2, which includes a limitations paragraph.
Version two, labeled NL, is the similar to AS but does not contain
a limitations paragraph. The final version, labeled FW, is similar
to the NL format but contains fraud wording language (e.g., we
plan and perform an examination to obtain reasonable assurance
about whether the Company’s internal control is sufficient to
detect/prevent material errors, irregularities, or fraud).
6

The three versions of the report with survey questions are in the Appendix at
the end of the paper. A complete set of survey material packet items can be
obtained from the authors.
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The participants were asked the eleven questions using a
between-subjects design since prior research has demonstrated that
subjects can become oversensitive to the variables being tested
with a within-subjects design (Pany and Reckers 1987).
Additionally, a context-free frame of reference is used to minimize
the potential confounding effects and potential biasing that
including additional information about either the client or the
auditor might create.
Therefore, an entire set of financial statements is not
presented with the auditor’s internal control report as this would
have unnecessarily increased the length of the survey and
potentially distracted participants’ from the focus of the study.
Prior studies have used this approach (Pany and Reckers, 1987;
Kelly and Mohrweis, 1989; Yardley 1989; Hasan et al., 2003) and
report that users did not have difficulty completing the task in a
context-free framework.
Of interest in this study is the impact report format has on
users’ perceptions of the internal control report along the
readability, reliability and liability dimensions. To test research
question 1, we compare French users’ perceptions to those of U.S.
users’ perceptions along the identified dimensions using the AS
format of the report. Previous studies have shown that user
perceptions can be affected by report formatting (Hasan et al.,
2003) and wording changes (Bailey et al., 1983; Kelly and
Mohrweis, 1989; Houghton and Messier, 1991). Therefore, we test
research question 2, by comparing French and U.S. responses to
the FW version of the report and compare those responses to the
AS format.
Results
We initially performed a MANOVA, with Bonferroni
adjustment, on the data to determine the effects of two user groups
(French and U.S.) and three treatment variables (AS, NL, and FW)
on three dependent variables (readability, reliability, and liability).
The MANOVA results are summarized in Panel A of Table 1. We
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find that ratings of internal control reports are affected by country
(p= 0.038), not by report type (p= 0.328), but there is a moderately
significant interaction (p=0.083) between country and report type.
Because MANOVA results were significant, we performed
ANOVAs to analyze each of the dependent variables (readability,
reliability, and liability). The ANOVA results are reported in
Panels B, C, and D of Table 1. Country is significant for the
readability (p= 0.028) and liability (p= 0.027) dimensions, report
type is significant only for the reliability dimension (p=0.051), and
the interaction term is significant in the readability (p= 0.070) and
reliability dimension (p= 0.011).
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Table 1
MANOVA and ANOVA results
Panel A: multivariate analysis of variance
Wilks’
Effect
F-Statistic
Lambda
Country
0.95
2.88
Report type
0.96
1.16
Interaction
0.93
1.89
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p-Value
0.038
0.328
0.083

Panel B: ANOVA results for the readability dimension
Effect
Mean square
F-value
p-Value
Country
5.84
4.92
0.028
Report type
2.19
1.84
0.162
Interaction
3.22
2.71
0.070
Panel C: ANOVA results for the reliability dimension
Effect
Mean square
F-value
p-Value
Country
0.52
0.52
0.474
Report type
2.98
3.03
0.051
Interaction
4.59
4.66
0.011
Panel D: ANOVA results for the liability dimension
Effect
Mean square
F-value
p-Value
Country
4.89
4.93
0.027
Report type
0.29
0.30
0.743
Interaction
0.08
0.08
0.927
Notes. Country refers to user group, either U.S. or French and
report type refers to one of three report formats (AS = internal
control report format established by the PCAOB; NL = the AS
internal control report format without a limitations paragraph; and
FW = the NL internal control report format incorporating fraud
wording).

We use univariate results to identify the specific differences
in mean ratings of the internal control report formats between U.S.
and French users, summarized in Table 2. Panel A of Table 2
indicates that significant differences exist between U.S. and French
users in the readability dimension when the report format includes
fraud wording (p<0.05). Inclusion of the auditor’s responsibility
for fraud also significantly increases U.S. users’ readability rating
when compared to the AS format (p<0.05). Panel B of Table 2
presents similar results for the reliability dimension. With respect
to the FW report incorporating fraud wording, the differences in
mean ratings for readability and reliability between U.S. and
French users differ significantly (p<0.10) and for U.S. users the
difference in mean ratings between the FW and AS format is
significant (p<0.05). These results indicate that U.S. users rate
significantly more favorably the FW format than their French
counterparts and also more favorably than the AS format.
Panel C of Table 2 indicates there are no significant
differences between U.S. and French users along the liability
dimension. While the purpose of this paper is not to test the
efficacy of a limitations paragraph, analyses do include a
comparison of the AS and FW formats to the NL format. Tests
indicate no significant difference between the AS and NL format or
the NL and FW format. Thus, we conclude that the limitations
paragraph is not driving any of the results we report.
Summarizing the data, we find no differences between the
U.S. and French users’ perceptions of the internal control report
when comparing responses related to the AS report format. These
findings suggest that an auditor’s internal control report could
provide value to user groups outside the U.S. By comparison, U.S.
and French users differ significantly along the readability and
reliability dimensions when comparing an auditor’s internal
control report that contains fraud wording. This increase in U.S.
perceptions’ of the report may be because U.S. users’ desire for
auditor’s to detect fraud and explicit acknowledgement of that
responsibility provides comfort to readers of audit reports. In
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contrast, French users’ perception did not change when comparing
different report formats perhaps because auditor responsibility for
fraud detection is codified into law and fully expected regardless of
the wording in the audit report.
Table 2
Bonferroni pairwise comparison of mean responses
(92 U.S. and 72 French subjects)
Panel A: Readability dimension
Report type means
Difference
(std. dev.)
Country
AS
NL
FW
AS-NL AS-FW NL-FW
U.S.
4.74
4.97
5.55
0.23
0.81**
0.61
(1.25) (0.92) (1.31)
France
4.62
4.89
4.60
0.27
0.02**
0.29
(0.99) 0.99) (0.93)
Difference 0.12
0.08
0.95**
Panel B: Reliability dimension
Report type means
(std. dev.)
Country
AS
NL
FW
U.S.
4.12
4.54
5.16
(1.06) (0.95) (1.16)
France
4.57
4.47
4.45
(0.98) (0.90) (0.80)
Difference 0.45
0.07
0.71*

Difference
AS-NL
0.42

AS-FW
1.04**

NL-FW
0.62

0.10

0.12**

0.02
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Table 2 -continued
Panel C: Liability dimension
Report type means (std.
Difference
dev.)
Country
AS
NL
FW
AS-NL AS-FW NL-FW
U.S.
3.81
3.79
3.65
0.02
0.16
0.14
(1.11) (0.95) (1.17)
France
4.19
4.05
4.05
0.14
0.14
0.00
(1.00) (0.92) (0.62)
Difference 0.38
0.26
0.40
Notes. AS = internal control report format established by the
PCAOB; NL = the AS internal control report format without a
limitations paragraph; and FW = the NL internal control report
format incorporating fraud wording.
*Significant at p-value <0.10 for one tailed test
** Significant at p-value <0.05 for one tailed test

CONCLUSION
The harmonization between U.S. GAAP and International
Financial Reporting Standards has been the focus of much
attention in recent years (for example, Hail et al., 2010a, 2010b;
Daske et al., 2008; Bradshaw, et al., 2010). Less quietly, however,
there has been an ongoing project between the AICPA and IAASB
to harmonize auditing standards. Therefore, we extend the
literature on accounting harmonization by studying audit
harmonization. In particular, we compared data related to U.S. and
French users’ perceptions of the auditor’s report on internal control
of financial reporting along the readability, reliability, and liability
dimensions. Specifically, we investigated whether the two groups
evaluated the report similarly and to what extent the inclusion of
fraud wording enhanced the users’ perception of the report.
Our study’s findings make at least two important
contributions to the ongoing policy debate regarding the
harmonization of audit standards. First, our results indicate that
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U.S. and French users rate the PCAOB AS2 (replaced by AS5)
required internal control report similarly, with no significant
differences along the three dimensions. These results suggest that
U.S. and French users have similar information needs (not
surprising given the increasing importance of French equity
markets over the last 15 years) and thus, auditor’s internal control
report could potentially be value-relevant for non-U.S. users.
Second, we found that the inclusion of fraud wording
increased positively/favorably U.S. users’ perceptions of the report
along the readability and reliability dimensions, but had no
significant impact on French user perceptions. These results
suggest that fraud wording in an internal control report does not
favorably increase French users’ perceptions, but does favorably
increase U.S. users’ perceptions of the readability and reliability
(audit assurance) dimensions of such a report format (possibly due
to U.S. users’ sensitivity to fraud caused by some of the accounting
scandals, such as Enron, WorldCom). These results are not
surprising because French auditors are legally required to report
instances of fraud to a public prosecutor (Jedidi & Richard, 2009).
Thus, from a French perspective, inclusion of fraud wording may
be considered redundant because of a societal expectation that
French auditors actively search and detect fraud. In contrast, some
of the major accounting scandals around the turn of the century
(e.g., Enron, Worldcom) appear to have influenced U.S. users to
believe that fraud detection should be an explicit part of the
auditors’ responsibility.
Finally, recognition/inclusion of the auditor’s fraud
detection responsibility into the auditor’s internal control report
(FW format) does not appear to increase perceptions regarding
auditor liability for either user group. These results are not
surprising given the legal environment in the U.S. and the
definition of third party used in France. That is, users may
perceive legal liability at an already high level because of the
litigious nature of a society or by the standards used to define to
whom the auditor owes liability.
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Our research is limited, however. First we use MBA and
senior undergraduate (accounting/finance) students in our sample.
While Frederickson and Miller (2004) found significant differences
between professional investors and non-professional investors in
the assignment of stock prices based on pro forma and GAAP
disclosures, Elliot et al. (2007) found that students make judgments
consistent with non-professional investors when the experiment
was not an investment decision and had low integrative features.
Furthermore, in real-world decision contexts, subjects would be
performing with different pressures, motivations and a broader
information set.
Second, our sample is relatively small and consisted of
participants from limited geographic areas. Future studies could
broaden coverage by investigating similar perceptual processes
related to audit communications in other European countries and
other continents. In addition, it is not known if the perceptions of
our sample are reflective of other potential nonprofessional users
of an auditor’s internal control report. With that said, however, the
results should be generalizable and useful in policy debates
because of the relatively less complex nature of the task used for
experimental manipulation.
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APPENDIX
Report formats used for experimental manipulation: AS, NL & FW
AS—Format
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTING FIRM
To the Board of Directors and Stockholders of ABC Company
We have audited management’s assessment, included in the
accompanying Management Report on internal control, that ABC
Company (the “Company”) maintained effective internal control
over financial reporting as of December 31, 20X5, based on criteria
established in Internal Control-Integrated Framework issued by
the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO). The Company’s management is responsible
for maintaining effective internal control over financial reporting
and for its assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over
financial reporting. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on
management’s assessment and an opinion on the effectiveness of
the Company’s internal control over financial reporting based on
our audit.
We conducted our audit in accordance with the standards of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States).
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain reasonable assurance about whether effective internal
control over financial reporting was maintained in all material
respects. Our audit included obtaining an understanding of internal
control over financial reporting, evaluating management’s
assessment, testing and evaluating the design and operating
effectiveness of internal control, and performing such other
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procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We
believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinions.
A company’s internal control over financial reporting is a process
designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability
of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements
for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles. A company’s internal control over financial
reporting includes those policies and procedures that (1) pertain to
the maintenance of records that, in reasonable detail, accurately
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of
the company; (2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are
recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and
that receipts and expenditures of the company are being made only
in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of
the company; and (3) provide reasonable assurance regarding
prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or
disposition of the company’s assets that could have a material
effect on the financial statements.
Because of its inherent limitations, internal control over financial
reporting may not prevent or detect misstatements on a timely
basis. Also, projections of any evaluation of the effectiveness to
future periods are subject to the risk that controls may become
inadequate because of changes in conditions, or that the degree of
compliance with the policies or procedures may deteriorate.
In our opinion, management’s assessment that the Company
maintained effective internal control over financial reporting as of
December 31, 20X5, is fairly stated, in all material respects, based
on the criteria established in Internal Control-Integrated
Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
of the Treadway Commission (COSO). Also in our opinion, the
Company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal
control over financial reporting as of December 31, 20X5, based on
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the Internal Control-Integrated Framework issued by the
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO) criteria.
We have also audited, in accordance with the standards of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States), the
balance sheet of the company as of December 31, 20X5, and the
related statements of income, shareholders’ equity, and cash flows
for the year ended December 31, 20X5 of the Company and our
report dated February 28, 20X6 expressed an unqualified opinion
on those financial statements.
Signed: XYZ & Co, CPAs, February 28, 20X6

NL—Format
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTING FIRM
To the Board of Directors and Stockholders of ABC Company
We have audited management’s assessment, included in the
accompanying Management Report on internal control, that ABC
Company (the “Company”) maintained effective internal control
over financial reporting as of December 31, 20X5, based on criteria
established in Internal Control-Integrated Framework issued by
the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO). The Company’s management is responsible
for maintaining effective internal control over financial reporting
and for its assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over
financial reporting. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on
management’s assessment and an opinion on the effectiveness of
the Company’s internal control over financial reporting based on
our audit.
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We conducted our audit in accordance with the standards of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States).
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain reasonable assurance about whether effective internal
control over financial reporting was maintained in all material
respects. Our audit included obtaining an understanding of internal
control over financial reporting, evaluating management’s
assessment, testing and evaluating the design and operating
effectiveness of internal control, and performing such other
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We
believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinions.
A company’s internal control over financial reporting is a process
designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability
of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements
for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles. A company’s internal control over financial
reporting includes those policies and procedures that (1) pertain to
the maintenance of records that, in reasonable detail, accurately
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of
the company; (2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are
recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and
that receipts and expenditures of the company are being made only
in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of
the company; and (3) provide reasonable assurance regarding
prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or
disposition of the company’s assets that could have a material
effect on the financial statements.
In our opinion, management’s assessment that the Company
maintained effective internal control over financial reporting as of
December 31, 20X5, is fairly stated, in all material respects, based
on the criteria established in Internal Control-Integrated
Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
of the Treadway Commission (COSO). Also in our opinion, the
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Company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal
control over financial reporting as of December 31, 20X5, based on
the Internal Control-Integrated Framework issued by the
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO) criteria.
We have also audited, in accordance with the standards of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States), the
balance sheet of the company as of December 31, 20X5, and the
related statements of income, shareholders’ equity, and cash flows
for the year ended December 31, 20X5 of the Company and our
report dated February 28, 20X6 expressed an unqualified opinion
on those financial statements.
Signed: XYZ & Co., CPAs, February 28, 20X6
FW—Format
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTING FIRM
To the Board of Directors and Stockholders of ABC Company
We have audited management’s assessment, included in the
accompanying Management Report on internal control, that ABC
Company (the “Company”) maintained effective internal control
over financial reporting as of December 31, 20X5, based on criteria
established in Internal Control-Integrated Framework issued by
the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO). The Company’s management is responsible
for maintaining effective internal control over financial reporting
and for its assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over
financial reporting. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on
management’s assessment and an opinion on the effectiveness of
the Company’s internal control over financial reporting based on
our audit.
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We conducted our audit in accordance with the standards of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States).
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain reasonable assurance about whether effective internal
control over financial reporting was maintained in all material
respects. Our audit included obtaining an understanding of internal
control over financial reporting, evaluating management’s
assessment, testing and evaluating the design and operating
effectiveness of internal control, and performing such other
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We
believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinions.
A company’s internal control over financial reporting is a process
designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability
of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements
for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles. A company’s internal control over financial
reporting includes those policies and procedures that (1) pertain to
the maintenance of records that, in reasonable detail, accurately
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of
the company; (2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are
recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and
that receipts and expenditures of the company are being made only
in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of
the company; (3) provide reasonable assurance regarding
prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or
disposition of the company’s assets that could have a material
effect on the financial statements; and (4) provide reasonable
assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of error or fraud
that could have a material effect on the financial statements.
In our opinion, management’s assessment that the Company
maintained effective internal control over financial reporting as of
December 31, 20X5, is fairly stated, in all material respects, based
on the criteria established in Internal Control-Integrated
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Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
of the Treadway Commission (COSO). Also in our opinion, the
Company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal
control over financial reporting to provide reasonable assurance
regarding prevention or timely detection of error or fraud as of
December 31, 20X5, based on the criteria established in Internal
Control-Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO)
criteria.
We have also audited, in accordance with the standards of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States), the
balance sheet of the company as of December 31, 20X5, and the
related statements of income, shareholders’ equity, and cash flows
for the year ended December 31, 20X5 of the Company and our
report dated February 28, 20X6 expressed an unqualified opinion
on those financial statements, which were free of material
misstatements due to error or fraud.
Signed: XYZ & Co., CPAs, February 28, 20X6
Survey Questions
Readability dimension
1. The message communicated by the above independent
accountant’s report (on ABC Company’s internal control
structure) is completely understandable.
3. The purposes of the audit of ABC Company’s internal control
structure are clearly communicated in the above independent
accountant’s report.
Reliability Dimension
2. How confident are you that ABC Company’s internal control
structure is capable of producing financial statements free of
material errors for the year 19X8?
5. How confident are you that ABC Company’s internal control
structure is capable of producing financial statements free of
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material misstatements due to an irregularity for the year
19X8?
7. How confident are you that ABC Company’s internal control
structure is capable of producing financial statements free of
material misstatements due to fraud for the year 19X8?
10. From the above independent accountant’s report, it can be
concluded that ABC Company’s internal control structure is
capable of producing financial statements free of material
misstatements for the year 19X8.
11. The degree of assurance about the reliability of ABC
Company’s internal control structure provided by the above
independent accountant’s report is higher.
Liability dimension
4. The likelihood that the above independent accountant’s report
will expose the independent accountant (auditor) of ABC
Company to legal liability is higher.
6. The likelihood that the above independent accountant’s report
on (ABC Company’s internal control structure) will lead to a
lawsuit against the independent accountant (auditor) of ABC
Company is higher.
8. By issuing the above independent accountant’s report, the
independent accountant (auditor) of ABC Company assumes a
great amount of risk.
9. It is clear from the above independent accountant’s report (on
ABC Company’s internal control structure) that the
independent accountant (auditor) of ABC Company is
assuming a high degree of responsibility.

